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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HILDA A. BRIMM,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
CACHE VALLEY BANKING CO.
a corporation, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF ANDREW
ANDERSEN, AKA, ANDREW
ANDERSON, Deceased.
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 7979
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
Point No. 1. The court erred in finding and holding
that the water rights represented by certificate No. 24, for
112 shares of the Capital Stock of the Mendon Central
Irrigation Company, a corpo-ration, is appurtenant to the
lands described in the findings and decree.
On page 3 of respondent's brief it is contended that
the stock certificate ( Def's. Ex. 4) is invalid because
Andrew Andersen did not own any land when the Mendon
Central Irrigation Company was organized. On page 2
of the abstract of Title, (Pis. Ex. A) there is a deed from
Andrew Sorensen, Mayor of Mendon City, to Andrew
Andersen, conveying to him 17.63 acres; and on page .t
there appears a deed from Kelsey Bird, et. ux. conveying
3
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to him the 2/110 acre tract. On page 7 of abstract (Ex.
"A"), there appears a Inortgage dated November 22, 1893,
whereby Andrew and Sophia Andersen, mortgaged this
property to James Quayle and Company to secure a debt
of $750. This mortgage was cancelled on September 17,
1895, and apparently a deed to this property was substituted as appears on page 8 of (Ex. A) and, when the debt
was paid, the property was deeded to Sophia. And on
July 23, 1918, and after the Mendon Central Irrigation
Company was incorporated, and the stock certificate
(De£'s. Ex. -!) was issued and delivered to Andrew Andersen, he executed a second deed to her, for the 2/110 acres.
But sections 315, Compiled laws of Utah, 1907, and
section 861, Compiled law of Utah 1917, did not specifically provide that an incorporator must own any particular
property at time of incorporation. The statute requires
( 3) "The names of the incorporators and their places of
residence; ( 7) The amount of stock each party has sub- .
scribed; and, ( 8) the amount of each share and the limit
of capital stock agreed upon." In Article 7 of the Articles
of Incorporation, the names of the incorporators are listed,
with their places of residence, and the amount of stock
subscribed by each, with value of each share.
In view of the fact that the Corporate stock was fully
paid by a transfer of the waters of the springs, and Andrew
and Sophia, joined in the execution of Def's. Ex. 1, the
Deed of Water Rights, then the water which was prior
thereto appurtenant to their land, was conveyed and transferred to the Corporation, in full con1pliance with the provisions of section 862, Compiled Law of Utah, 1917. When
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this deed was delivered to the officers of the Corporation,
it was their duty to issue the stock certificate to Andrew
Anderse~, as one of the incorporators.
But for the sake of Argument, suppose Sophia Andersen had been one of the incorporators, and the certificate
was issued to her and she died leaving the stock in her
name, then it would be necessary to probate her estate,
and the same heirs at law would be effected. Therefore,
it is difficult to perceive the materiality of Coimsel's Contention on page 3 of respondent's brief.
On pages four, five and six of respondent's brief, counsel refers to the conveyances and transfers of the land
described in plaintiff's complaint. It is also mentioned
that said land had been irrigated, from waters represented
by the stock issued to Andrew Andersen. It is difficult to
perceive how that is material to any issue in this case.
Even assuming that it was the same water it was merely a
gratuitious use. He also emphasizes that the land is of
little value without water. Assuming these facts to be
true it does not justify the confiscation of private property.
There are many instances where one person is permitted
to use .the property of another for various periods of time,
but that alone does not constitute a transfer of title to the
property.
On page 9 of respondent's brief, Counsel states that "Under our decisions water is 'appurtenant', if water is
used in direct connection with the real estate conveyed,"citing Thompson vs. McKinney 63 P. 2nd. 1056. From an
examination of the opinion in that case it will be seen that
the water was not owned by a corporation, as appears from
the following excerpt from the opinion:
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"There was no corporation or other organization by
which shares of stock were issued. There is no
question in this case respecting water rights represented by shares of stock in a corporation."

It is contended on page 9, that the decision in George
vs. Robison has been overruled by In re Johnson Estate,
228 Pac. 7-!8. When the facts in the Johnson case are carefullv examined it will be seen that there is a distinction
between the facts in that case and the facts in George vs.
Robison, supra, and in the case at bar. In the first place
the water right consisting of 56~ shares, and the land upon
which it had been used were both owned by Olaus Johnson, the testator.
It must also be remembered that the Johnson case involved the construction of a will. And the rule is well
settled by statute, Sections 101-2-1, 101-2-2, U.C.A. 1943
(sections 6347, 6348), Comp. Laws of Utah, 1917 that"A will is to be construed according to the intention of
the testator. Where his intention can not have effect to
its full extent, it must have effect as far as possible."
(Section 101-2-1 ). '1n case of uncertainty arising upon
the face of a will as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from
the words of the will, taking into view the circumstances
under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations." (Section 101-2-2).

The court in re Johnson's Estate also distinguished
the facts in that case from George vs. Robison, 63 P. 819,
in the following language "But we think the decision itself is distinguishable,
in part at least, on account of the peculiar facts in the
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case and the conclusion reached. In George vs.
Robison - 'the water rights were not owned by the
grantor in the deed, but were owned by a third
person.'"
·
The same is true in the case at bar. When Catharine
Gibbons and John Andersen conveyed the land to plaintiff, they did not own the water in question, but it was
owned by the Estate of Andrew Andersen, deceased. It
must also be observed that the decision in the case in re
Johnson's Estate, supra, expressly stated that the general
rule stated in George vs. Robison, supra, should not be
modified but only "when applied to a case like in re
Johnson's Estate." And in a subsequent decision rendered
by this Court in Black vs. Johansen, 18 P. 2d. 901, a
further distinction was noted between the facts in the cases
of Snyder vs. Murdock and George vs. Robison, and the
facts in re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah, 114, 228 P. 748, and
in making this distinction the late Mr. Justice Straup
speaking for this Court said: "The cited cases of Snyder
vs. Murdock, 20 Utah, 419, 59 P. 91; and George vs. Robisofl 23 Utah 79, 63 P. 819, are not in conflict her~with.
They involve different facts."
On page 10 of respondent's brief the case of Cortella
vs. Salt Lake City, 72 P. 2nd 630, is cited. It is respectfully submitted that this case does not support respondent's judgment. The undisputed facts in that case show
that the water right in question was not represented hy
shares of stock in a corporation. The plaintiff, Cortella,
contended that the land which he acquired by mesne conveyances from the Preece heirs, had appurtenant to it a
water right in Parley's Canyon Creek. The trial court
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found in favor of Cortella's clain1, but on appeal, the
judgment was reversed. The following staten1ent by this
Court illustrates that the question involved in that case
was entirely different from the instant case. In dealing
with that distinction this Court stated- "\Ve are not dealing with water as personal property:~ ( Italics added) .
Respondent's counsel attempts to discredit the opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Oppenlander vs.
Left Hand Ditch Company reported in 31 Pac. 854, because it was not cited by this Court in George vs. Robison,
23 Utah, 79. 63 Pac. 819. Regardless of that omission the
Colorado case is nevertheless in point as an authority in
support of the holding of this Court in George vs. Robison,
supra.
The writer desires to call this Courts attention to
another Colorado case, viz., First National Bank vs. Hastings 42 Pac. 691, which is cited among appellant's authorities in the opinion of this Court in George vs. Robison. In
holding that a water right represented by shares of stock
in an incorporated irrigation company is not appurtenant
to the land upon which it has been used, Justice Thomson
said:
"For the purpose of showing a transfer to the interveners of title to ditch stock, they introduced in
evidence, against the plaintiff's objection, a deed executed to them by Dickson on May 1, 1891, conveying
to them a certain tract of land, and all the water rights
in any way pertaining or belonging to the land. The
deed was improperly received. Water rights belonging to land and stock in a ditch corporation are two
essentially different kinds of property. A real-estate
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owner may have the right to water for the purpose of
irrigating his land without owning any ditch stock,
and a stockholder in a ditch company may be without
right to water for irrigation or without land, to irrigate.. Water rights for irrigation are regarded as real
property, and shares of stock in a corporation are
personal property. The deed conveyed all rights in
water pertaining to the land described for the purpose
of its irrigation, but it no more conveyed the grantor's
water stock than .it conveyed his horses." (Italics
supplied).
In a later Colorado case, Oligarchy Ditch Company
et. al. vs. Farm lnv. Company, 88 Pac. 443, the water right
was represented by shares of stock in Oligarchy Ditch
Company, a corporation. It is submitted that the rule
adhered to in that case, is applicable in the case at bar.
Mr. Justice Bailey, speaking for the Court said:
"While there are many cases which hold that a
water right or a private ditch may pass with a conveyance of land as appurtenant thereto, yet we know
of no case, and counsel has called our attention to
none, wherein it is held that a corporation owning a
ditch, and furnishing the right to carry water to its
stockholders only, must continue to carry water for
land which has been conveyed to a stranger, while
the stock which gave the right remained in the hands
of the original owner or had been transferred to other
parties."
The last clause of the foregoing quotation is certainly
in point with the facts in the instant case, since the title
to the lands passed from Sophia Andersen, through three
parties to the plaintiff, while the ownership in the water
stock remained in the estate of Andrew Andersen, deceased.
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On page 11 of respondent's brief it is contended that
the water used upon the land prior to the incorporation of
the :\lendon Central Irrigation Company, was not severed
from the land. Counsel contends that although the severance deed (defendant's Ex. 1) was executed by Andrew
and Sophia Andersen, and delivered to the officers of the
Company, and in consideration for which the Corporation
issued the stock, to Andrew Andersen, yet because water
from the Canal has been used upon land, the water represented by said certificate is appurtenant to the land. This
contention is contrary to the holding of this Court in
George vs. Robison and Snyder vs. :Murdock.
The fact that heirs of Andrew Andersen did not earlier
probate his estate is immaterial- The water was used by
his wife, son and daughter, and the other heirs permitted
them to use the water, but at most this was a pet:missive
use - and moreover, it being personal property, it could
not be appurtenant to the land and hence could not be
subject for a quiet title action.
It is a matter of common knowledge with the bench
and bar that some estates, involving real and personal
property, are not probated for many years after the death
of the decedent.

On page 13 of respondent's brief, the case of East
River Bottom water Company vs. Boyce, 128 P. 2d. 277 is
cited. It is conceded in the opinion in that case, that a
Deed of Waters Rights, similar to defendant's Ex. 1, was
not executed by the incorporators and their wives. See
pages 15-17 of appellant's brief for a distinction between
that case and the case at bar.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

It is respectfully urged that the decision rendered by
this Court in Adamson vs. Brockbank 185 P. 2d. 264 is not
in point. The facts in that case are dissimilar. In that
case the irrigation ditch over plaintiffs land had been used
for more than 20 years - to convey water to adjoining
lands owned by plaintiffs. When defendant destroyed the
ditch, plaintiffs sued for damages. It did not involve a
water right, but an easement right to convey water through
the ditch to plaintiff's lands, which right was held to be
appurtenant to their land.

It is respectfully submitted that the holding by the
Supreme Court of Montana in Yellowtsone Valley Company vs. Associated Mortgagors Investors, 290 P. 255, does
not support plaintiff's action in the instant case. The
Montana Court held that under the circumstances in that
case, the water right was appurtenant to the land, but
because of the foreclosure - "the plaintiff had no right,
title, or interest in either the land or water stock."
Under similar facts in the case of Bank of Visalia vs.
Smith (Cal. ) 81 Pac. 542, the Supreme Court of California
held contrary to the Montana Court. The facts in the
California case are very similar to the facts in George vs.
Robison, 63 Pac. 819. The California Court held that "Shares of stock, as such, are not presumptively appurtenant to land."
Point No. II. The court erred in finding and holding,
that the water intended to be and represented by the said
112 shares of said capital stock, and the water so used
upon said lands is one and the same identical water, and
that said water was never by any owner thereof either
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seve·red or intended to be severed frmn said lands, or used
otherwise than for the irrigation of said lands described
in the findings and decree.

Respondent's counsel directs his argument to the last
clause of the above point, and argues that, "the water was
never by any owner thereof either severed or intended to
be severed from the lands." The case of East River Bottom
Water Company, 128 P. 2d. 277 is again referred to, but
that case has been distinguished in this brief, and it was
also distinguished at pages 15-17 of appellants brief, to
which reference is hereby made.
It is contended that because the record title to the
Andersen property was in Sophia Andersen, that the stock
should not have been issued to Andrew Andersen, but
Should have been issued to Sophia. This question has
already been discussed. Suppose that the stock certificate
No. 24 as it now stands was in the name of Sophia instead
of Andrew. Just how that could benefit the plaintiff is
difficult to perceive in view of the fact that the heirs at
law of Sophia and Andrew are identical. Plaintiff has
produced no evidence showing she would be in a preferable position had the stock certificate No. 24 been issued to Sophia instead of Andrew.

On page 21 of respondent's brief it is contended that"It cannot be presumed he wanted her to have the land

and not the water with it, if so he would not have conveyed the 2.50 acre tract to her. When this deed was
executed to Sophia on July 23, 1918, Andrew was the
owner of the 112 shares of capital stock of the Irrigation
Company, which was issued to him on April30, 1918. And
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prior thereto Andrew and Sophia had jointly transferred
the appurtenance rights in the water to the Irrigation
Company, by their execution of the Deed of Water Rights
( Def' s. Ex. 1.)
Point No. III. The court erred in finding and holding that the said water stock certificates never has been
and is not now personal property separate and apart from
said lands, or even so considered.
Respondent's argument under point 3, revolves
around the ownership of the stock. Mr. Sorensen, secretary of the Water Company testified, ( R. 44) that the
signature of Andrew Andersen, appears on stub of certificate No. 24, which acknowledges that he received the
certificate, and that so far as the Corporation is concerned,
Andrew Andersen's estate is the owner of the stock.
( R. 45) . There is no evidence offered by plaintiff to
dispute this fact. The fact that the certificate has been
misplaced or lost is not material. The evidence show that
Andrew Andersen received it, and no other certificate
has been issued in its place. Moreover, the secretary
of the Corporation testified that the Company recognized
Andrew Andersen's estate as the owner of the stock. Much
of what is stated by Counsel on pages 23-25 of respondent's
brief is answered by appellant's brief pages 17-20.
On pages 6 and 7 of respondent's brief, Counsel indulges in the assumption that Andrew Andersen must
have assigned this stock to his wife, Sophia. If that
actually occurred, then why didn't Sophia present the
certificate No. 24, to the secretary and procure a new certificate? But just how such an assumption is material is
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difficult to perceive. If Sophia did have a certificate why
did she not assign the same to her son, L. ~1., when she
conveyed the lands to him on November 26,1922 (Ab. l.t)
and o~ January 2--L 1924, (A b. 15). A water right is not
mentioned in either of these deeds. The only assumption
permissable is that Andrew Andersen's wife, Sophia, and
their son, L. ~I. knew that the water stock was issued to
Andrew Andersen, and that on account of his demise the
stock could not be transferred, except by probate, and so
they continued to use the water, in the absence of any
objection from the other children.
Point No. IV. The court erred in finding and holding
that the Mendon Central Irrigation Company, is a tnutual
company and that the interest in the water was conveyed
with the land as an appurtenance.
By counsel's remarks under this point on page 26 of
respondent's brief, it is conceded that the water right
owned by other land owners under the Mendon Central
Irrigation Company were transferred by the issuance of
a new certificate or certificates in lieu of the old certificate.
Counsel says, that - "Nothing irregular is seen in issuing
of new certificates in lieu of old ones." How does this
admission square with plaintiff's failure to prove that in
the instant case, there has been no transfer of the 112
shares issued to Andrew Andersen, as evidenced by the
stub No. 24. Plaintiff's entire case is predicated upon the
proposition that because certain water has been used to
irrigate the Andersen lands, which is now owned by plaintiff, that the mere use of water from the canal, ipso facto,
amounted to a transfer of the legal title to the water,
represented by Certificate No. 24.
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Point V. The court erred in finding and holding that
plaintiff is entitled to an order declaring her to be the
owner of water right represented by the certificates of
stock number 24, and that another certificate of stock be
issued to plaintiff in lieu thereof for 112 shares of the capital stock of the Mendon Central Irrigation Company.
It appears from respondent's brief, page 27, that
there is a failure to answer appellant's contention on page
23 of it's brief to the effect that in view of the fact that
plaintiff's pleadings and testimony attempts to show that
plaintiff acquired title to the lands, and her theory was
that a mere use of the water entitled plaintiff to a judgment, decreeing to her the water on the theory that it was
appurtenant to the land. However, even though this was
plaintiff's theory as reflected by her pleadings and evidence, it is evident that plaintiff has now concluded that
in order to procure legal title to the water, she must have
a certificate of stock issued to her by the Mendon Central
Irrigation Company. The plaintiff's entire case rests upon
the theory of ownership based upon an appurtenance
right; however, under point V she is now completely
changing her theory, to ownership evidenced by a
certificate of stock. Manifestly, from plaintiff's complaint
and her evidence, it all points to the fact that the water is
appurtenant to the land and is thus considered as real
property, but no doubt plaintiff realizes that she could
not own water under such a right when the remaining
ownership to the water under the system is evidenced by
certificates of stock held by the remaining stockholders
of the Corporation.
Point No. VI. The court erred in nwking and enter-
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ing its finding four ( R. 11) since the action therein referred to involved different property and different issues.
Respondent does not explain why findings No. 4 was
included in the findings in as much as the court sustained
appellant's objection to the introduction of the opinion
rendered by this court in Gibbons vs. Brimm, 230 P. 2d.
983, at the time it was offered during the trial. ( R. 39).
It is very evident that respondent attempted in every way
possible to prejudice the trial court against the defendant
during the trial by attempting to enlist the court's sympathy by attempting to show that she had incurred an
obligation. However, in view of the fact that the decision
in this case was drawn to the attention of the court it could
very likely have had a direct bearing upon the decision of
the trial court in the case at bar. In view of the fact that
the appellant did bring this case to the attention of the
trial court, it should be kept in mind that there was included in the opinion of this court in that case another
transaction involving a note for $8000, secured by mortgage to which the plaintiff had an assignment and has
since received the proceeds owing on that indebtedness,
which the trial court apparently overlooked. It is difficult
to understand why the respondent brought this extraneous
matter before the court since it has no legal relation to
the issues involved in the case at bar. The subject matter
in this action is a separate and distinct property right
belonging to the estate of Andrew Andersen, deceased,
and it should not in any way be affected by transactions
occurring between the plaintiff and Catherine Gibbons.
Point No. VII. The court erred in rendering its judgment and decree that the water represented by the 112
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shares of capital stock in the Mendon Central Irrigation
Company, a corporation is appurtenant to the lands described in said decree, and that plaintiff is the legal and
equitable owner of said water - and that the said Mendon
Central Irrigation Company, be directed to issue to plaintiff a certificate for 112 shares of stock to replace the
certificate issued to Andrew Andersen, deceased, in his
lifetime, and the court further erred in rendering its further
judgment and decree; that the Cache Valley Banking
Company, administrator of the Estate of Andrew Andersen, deceased, nor any of the heirs at law of his estate have
no interest, ownership or title in either the water, or Certificate of Stock covering the same, or any part thereof,
and that the plaintiff's title therto is good and valid and is
quieted in her, and that the administrator and heirs of the
estate of Andrew Andersen, are estopped, enfoined, and
-restrained from asserting any right, title or interest whatsoever in said water or stock covering same.
Respondent's counsel in his attempt to answer appellant's complaint to the court's findings, No. 7, page 27 of
appellant's brief;again indicated that plaintiff's sole claim
to his water is based upon an appurtant water right. This
claim is made in the very face of the undisputed facts that
the water right in question is represented by 112 shares of
stock issued by the Mendon Central Irrigation Company,
a Corporation, which is held by this court to be personal
property. It is respectfully submitted that the cases cited
by respondent's counsel have in this brief been distinguished from the case at bar. Counsel erroneously contends
that the cases of Snyder vs Murdock, 50 Pac. 9, and George
ves. Robison, 63 Pac. 819, were over-ruled by the decision
in re Johnson's estate. This court held in Black vs. Johan-
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sen 18. 2d. 901, that the decision in re Johnson's estate
was distinguishe# the cases of George vs. Robison and
Snyder vs. ~1urdock, on the ground that they involved
different facts.
Counsel concedes that the present action is one
to quiet title. At the time when this action was
brought Section 104-57-1. U.C.A. 1943, was in force
and effect, and it provides that,- "An action may be
brought by any person against another who claims an
estate or interest in real property adverse to him for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim."
Our statute which was in force when this action was
brought, Section 18-2-33, 1943, provides among other
things, that,- "Stock shall be deemed personal property."
It is next contended that the use of the water by the
heirs of Andrew Anderson, deceased, since his death was
not permissive. This statement is squarely contrary to
the evidence. Sophia Andersen, L. M. Andersen, and
Catherine Gibbons, were permitted to use water on said
lands through the forebearance of the remaining heirs of
Andrew Andersen, deceased.

This is simply a case where one heir is attempting
to appropriate to herself property that belongs equally to
herself and the remaining eight heirs of said estate.
The defendant and appellant respectfully submits
to this Honorable Court that the findings, conclusions
and judgment of the lower court be reversed, set aside
and held for naught, and for costs on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
L. E. NELSON,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant.
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